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This article assesses the compliance of China’s domestic laws in the area of intellectual 
property rights protection with the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS), which China obliged to accept upon its entrance into the WTO. It also 
discusses the implications which result from the implementation and enforcement of the 
intellectual property rights in China for doing business in China. The significance of 
intellectual property rights protection for achieving the strategic objects formulated by 
China’s policy-makers and China’s reputation in the world is tackled, as well. Qualitative 
research based on the concept of compliance showed that China’s compliance with its 
TRIPS obligation should be evaluated with respect to different country-specific as well as 
country non-specific factors. However, the experience from the historical development of the 
leading world inventors, such as Japan or the United Kingdom, should also be considered. 
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I. IntroductIon
After the announcement of economic reforms by Deng Xiaoping in the late 
1970s, China made massive steps to integrate into the world economy. The state 
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monopoly of foreign trade and the policy of autarkic self-reliance were abandoned 
and foreign trade decisions were decentralized. Special enterprise zones were 
created as free trade areas.1 Normalizing China’s diplomatic relations during 
the 1970s with the US, Japan and other developed market oriented countries 
contributed to lifting its international isolation. In 1971, China was admitted to the 
UN, and in 1980, regained its membership in the most influential economic and 
financial organizations, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (“IMF”).2 Since the early 1990s, China has increased its global outreach and 
participation in other international organizations.
As China has risen to a world economic power, its name is spelled in different 
forums. China has replaced the American and European controlled international 
financial institutions as the principle lender in Latin America. It is not only the 
largest investor in African energy and mineral resources, but also the principle 
market for Saudi Arabian, Sudanese and Iranian petroleum.3 In the first decade 
of the new millennium, China’s rise, together with other emerging developing 
countries that became known as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa), has changed the architecture of world trade.4 China is currently the 
world’s biggest manufacturer and exporter. While in 1973 China’s share in the 
world merchandise exports was only 1 percent, it was 14.2 percent in 2015.5 This 
means that China´s share in the world exports increased more than fourteen times 
during 1973‒2015, while the share of the US declined from 12.2 to 9.4 percent 
during the same period.6 In addition, the growing trade surpluses with its main 
trading partners enable China to achieve the highest reserves of foreign exchange 
in the world, which reached more than USD 3 trillion in 2016,7 holding over 
USD 1.3 trillion in the US treasury notes.8 In particular, Chinese yen (RMB)’s 
inclusion into the special drawing rights (“SDR”) on October 2016 is a milestone 
in the internationalization of its currency; it is an affirmation of the success of 
China's economic development.9 Since China has recorded economic success in 
many areas, it has become the subject of frequent academic discussions. Today, 
many authors are analyzing the impact of China’s economic growth and its WTO 
membership on other countries around the world.10 
China’s changing role in world trade is not expressed only by its growing 
market share, but also the structure of its exports. The reform measures carried out 
by China’s authorities during the 1980s and the 1990s, followed by the open‒door 
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policy, attracted investors from the US and other developed countries, who moved 
their production to China, including new technology and technical measures. In 
response to this challenge, China recorded success in the production and export 
of high-tech products. While the US and Japan recorded a decline of their market 
share in high-tech products during 1994-2007, China significantly increased it 
reaching 21.2 percent in 2007.11 In 2015, China’s high-technology export has 
already reached USD 554.3 billion, which accounted for 25.8 percent of the world 
market share.12 However, data about high-tech exports have to be considered 
carefully because China is included into multinational production chains, in which 
production and sales are distributed among several countries around the world.
China became the 143rd Member State of the World Trade Organization 
(“WTO”) on December 11, 2001 after 15 years of bilateral and multilateral 
negotiations.13 When China entered the WTO, it would obviously have to accept 
not only the general rules of the multilateral trade system, but also specific 
commitments in order to liberalize its trade regime and to provide easier access to 
its internal market for suppliers from other WTO members. Although China has 
now been a member of the WTO for more than 15 years and recorded significant 
progress in trade liberalization, the protection of intellectual property rights 
(“IPRs”) in China has been the subject of serious discussion and doubts all the 
time. Did China implement the WTO’s commitments into its laws? Why should 
China accept its WTO’s commitments? What role does intellectual property 
protection play in the current Chinese economy? What implications does it have 
on the private sector in China? What implications does it have on investors and 
patent-holders from the other WTO members? Especially, these questions open 
the door for interesting discussion. 
The article will begin by determining the IPRs issue in the frame of the WTO 
agreements and the complex of the multilateral trade rules. A mechanism for 
solving trade disputes among the WTO members is also introduced. The article 
will then focus on China’s commitments in the area of IPRs and explores if China 
implemented its commitments into its laws. It will discuss different factors and 
conditions that have an impact on the fulfilment of China’s commitments in the 
WTO in the area of IPRs including the enforcement of law on the state and local 
level. This means that the implementation of IPR’s commitments into China’s 
law as well as the effective enforcement of law is an important assumption for 
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achieving positive results and the protection of innovators and patent-holders. The 
article will mention not only the progress, but also current issues concerning the 
protection of IPRs that have remained in China all the time. The article will tackle 
these issues in a complex of China’s membership in the WTO, including the WTO 
dispute settlement system. Finally, it will consider the economic implications of 
IPRs (both residents and non-residents from the other WTO Member States) in 
China and the significance of IPR protection for the Chinese government.
II. Intellectual ProPerty rIghts: 
     From gatt to Wto 
Although the value of international trade in intellectual property (“IP”) is not 
statistically recorded, “intellectual property is information with a commercial 
value.”14 The owners of inventions, designs or other creations have a right to 
negotiate payment in return for others using them. In contrast to goods, the stock 
of this knowledge does not diminish with its consumption and the marginal cost 
of disseminating them is often zero.15 However, IP, especially the development 
of technological innovations, usually requires considerable investments and thus 
cost. The IPRs has special significance when developed countries would recognize 
that rapidly emerging economies, such as BRICS, are able to compete with them 
in many industrial areas. Although trade in counterfeit goods has been a problem 
for a long time, as technologies for duplication became more advanced and the 
reproduction of IP easier and cheaper, trade in goods embodying stolen IP became 
a more serious issue.16 
A. The First Steps in the Global IPRs Protection  
Before founding the WTO, several international conventions laid down standards 
for the protection of IP. The most important are the Paris Convention (on 
copyright), the Rome Convention (on neighbouring rights), and the Treaty on 
Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits. These and many others 
conventions are administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(“WIPO”). However, the WIPO was regarded as ineffective in enforcing the 
various treaties and the international conventions were not able to meet the 
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increasing needs of business communities that arose in the trade area.17 Unilateral 
measures for ensuring the IP protection enacted by the individual countries on the 
basis of national legislative, could not substitute those accepted on the multilateral 
level, either. Thus, multilateral trade rules started to be developed through the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) in the late 1940s, but the 
provisions and work related to IP were also limited.
In practice, strengthening the IP protection was not a priority for all countries. 
While the OECD countries called for multilateral rules and the enforcement of 
IPRs, many developing countries argued that the adoption of the OECD levels 
of IP protection would be detrimental to the welfare of their population and the 
development of their economy.18 Another concern of most developing countries 
was that a greater protection of IPRs would strengthen the monopoly power of 
multinational companies, thereby detrimentally affecting the poor population by 
raising the price of medicines and food.19 On the other hand, newly industrializing 
countries especially in Asia, dependent on the transfer of technology from 
developed countries, realized that inward foreign direct investments (“FDI”) 
would be conditioned by greater IP protection. That is why the IP issue was 
negotiated for several years during the GATT rounds of negotiations whose big 
part was to find the solution required to accept trade-offs from all countries (or, 
in other words, a trade-off between IPRs and the rest of the agenda). However, 
in contrast to other agenda, the negotiations about IPRs were not about freeing 
trade, but about more protection. At the end of the Uruguay Round in 1994, the 
contracting parties of the GATT 1947 signed an agreement establishing the WTO 
in which the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) 
became one of the three pillar agreements with GATT 1994 and the GATS.20 
Although the TRIPS Agreement allowed some exceptions on non-discrimination 
with respect to the number of international conventions in specific circumstances, 
it is possible to consider achieving trade-off in this area as the reason behind the 
success of the multilateral trade system.21 However, Stigliz argues that TRIPS 
should never have been part of the WTO, because it separates the developing and 
developed countries and has made it more difficult to close the gap between these 
two types of countries. He also maintains that it provides little protection for the IP 
of developing countries.22 Thus, finding the right balance between the interests of 
innovators (a lobby of patent- holders) and a wider public interest (a lobby of poor 
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countries) sometimes puts national governments into a difficult position, in which 
they have to make a decision following some compromises.
B. IPRs Protection under the WTO
The TRIPS Agreement defines IPRs as “the rights given to persons over the 
creations of their minds,” and it distinguishes (1) copyright and related rights, 
(2) trademarks, (3) geographical indications, (4) industrial designs, (5) patents, 
(6) layout designs (topographies) of integrated circuits, and (7) protection of 
undisclosed information.23 In contrast to the previous international conventions, 
the TRIPS Agreement establishes the minimum standards of protection for the 
above mentioned seven areas; sets minimum standards for the enforcement of 
IPRs in administrative and civil actions; makes the general dispute settlement 
mechanism of the WTO available to address TRIPS related issues; and extends 
basic GATT principles such as transparency, national treatment and most 
favoured nation (“MFN”) to IPRs.24 On the one hand, the TRIPS Agreement sets 
the minimal standards of protection, while, on the other hand, problems arise 
in context with the implementation of the commitment. Article 1 of the TRIPS 
Agreement provides: “… Members shall be free to determine the appropriate 
method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal 
system and practice.”25 The WTO members are obliged to provide procedures and 
remedies under their domestic law for the effective enforcement of IPRs of right-
holders on the principle of national treatment, which means to apply the IPRs rules 
in the same way for domestic as well as foreign subjects. 
Since 2001, the negotiations about IPR have continued in the frame of the 
Doha Development Round (“DDR”). They brought other changes in the TRIPS 
Agreement,26 which has currently resulted in two added amendments into the 
TRIPS Agreement. New amendments of the TRIPS Agreement, inserted into 
the new Article 31 bis of the Agreement as well as the Annex and Appendix, 
provide the legal basis for the WTO members to grant special compulsory licences 
exclusively for the production and export of affordable generic medicines to other 
members that cannot domestically produce the needed medicines in sufficient 
quantities for their patients.27 Besides public health, another task for the DDR is 
geographical indications and its registration system. In this area, the negotiations 
have continued all the time through the WTO TRIPS Council that is charged 
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with leading negotiations about all IPR issues. However, globalization and 
technological changes would bring new challenges for the TRIPS Agreement. 
For example, the rise of electronic commerce directed at the general consumer 
also raised issues for the protection of distinctive signs such as trademarks and 
geographical indications. Another concern is connected with the rise of trade in 
digital products.28 
Although the Council for TRIPS is responsible for administering the TRIPS 
Agreement, it does not have any power to impose sanctions for non-compliance. 
Thus, the non-complying members can be sanctioned only through the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism.29 The Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (“DSU”) is a legal base for the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism.30 It sets working procedures and a proposed 
timetable for panel work. From this aspect, the DSU mechanism is “one of the 
main achievements of the Uruguay Round, primarily because it ended the reliance 
of dispute settlement on the consensus principle that had led to the frequent non-
adoption of decisions.”31 Currently, when a respondent country in the dispute 
is its ‘loser,’ it must adopt the decision of the WTO panel or Appellate Body. 
Otherwise, compensation and the suspension of concessions are applied in 
compliance with Article 22 of the DSU. 
III. chIna’s IPrs under the Wto: 
       commItments and comPlIance
When China acceded to the WTO in 2001, it had already participated in the 
TRIPS negotiations during the Uruguay Round and had initialled the Final Act. 
In addition, China has already been a WIPO member since 1980. In the 1990s, 
China also signed different IPR conventions, such as the Madrid Agreement 
concerning the International Registration of Marks (1989), the Berne Convention 
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1992), the Universal Copyright 
Convention (1992), the Patent Cooperation Treaty (1994), the Budapest Treaty on 
the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes 
of Patent Procedure (1995), the Locarno Agreement Establishing an International 
Classification for Industrial Designs (1996), etc.32 The establishment of the 
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modern Chinese IPRs system was necessitated by the opening up of the Chinese 
economy in the late 1970s, which needed to attract FDI and fulfil the obligation 
stipulated in the bilateral agreements between the Chinese government and foreign 
governments on cooperation in science and technology.33  
During China’s accession process to the WTO, the Working Party explored 
the compliance of China’s legal system with the TRIPS Agreement. In addition, 
during the bilateral negotiations with some WTO members, China agreed to go 
some way beyond the requirements of the TRIPS Agreement.34 When China 
joined the WTO in 2001, it required the Chinese government to make changes to 
hundreds of laws, regulations and other measures affecting trade and investment.35 
In order to fulfil the compatibility of China’s IPR laws with the TRIPS Agreement, 
China is especially obliged to: 
1. ensure the national and MFN treatment to foreign right holders regarding all 
IPRs; 
2. amend its copyright laws to clarify the payment system by broadcasting 
organizations which use the recording products and include provisions in rental 
rights in respect to computer programs and movies, mechanical performance 
rights, the rights of communication to the public, the protection of database 
compilations, provisional measures, increasing the legitimate compensation 
amount and strengthening the measures against infringing activities; 
3. amend the trademark law to include a specific provision on the protection of 
geographical indications; 
4. insure the protection of domestic textile design by China’s Provisions on the 
Implementation of the International Copyright Treaty as works of applied art; 
5. modify the Patent Law to ensure improvements in the provisions regarding 
compulsory licensing for patents and the clarification of the subject matter that 
would be subject to compulsory licensing; 
6. ensure effective protection against an unfair commercial use of undisclosed test 
or other data submitted to authorities in China; 
7. ensure that China’s legal environment would be able to meet the requirements 
for enforcing the TRIPS Agreement; 
8. adequately compensate the damages paid by the infringer to the right holder; 
9. impose sufficient sanctions by administrative authorities to prevent or deter 
further infringement; and 
10. consider the monetary thresholds for bringing a criminal action to be able 
to address piracy and counterfeiting in order to lead criminal procedure more 
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effectively.36 
China has committed to abide fully by the rules of the TRIPS Agreement from 
the date of its accession to the WTO.37 No exceptions from the application of 
the TRIPS Agreement, not even a transitive period for the implementation of 
obligations, were negotiated among China and the WTO members. 
IV. chIna’s comPlIance WIth the trIPs 
       agreement
A. Theoretical Aspects of Assessing the Compliance
The concept of compliance is frequently used by political scientists in the field of 
international relations. More than the concept of compliance, however, it should 
be named “the concept of implementation” with respect to operationalizing 
compliance.38  The model makes a standard assumption about government 
behaviour. In general, it is assumed that states are rational and act in their 
own self-interest, and that they are aware of the impact of international law on 
behaviour.39 The violation of international law is not without cost. The first type of 
cost is sanctions, which other states may choose to impose when a given country 
violates international law, or does not fulfil its contractual obligations. Sanctions 
can have the form of economic or political measure. However, using sanctions is 
usually not an optimal solution of this problem. It often leads to escalating tension 
among countries, because every action causes additional social costs in the form of 
retaliatory measures or in other words “reciprocity in sanctions.” This idea is also 
expressed in the managerial theory of compliance that rejects sanctions and other 
forms of ‘hard’ enforcement in favour of the collective management of (non)-
performance.40 
The second type of cost for violating an international obligation is reputation. 
If a country violates international law, other states may refuse to enter into future 
agreements, demand greater concessions when entering into such agreements, or 
lose faith in the strength of existing agreements.41 In the WTO, the ‘bad’ reputation 
of a Member State is documented by its unfair trade practices, the violation of 
general WTO principles and rules or the non-fulfilment of specific commitments 
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that are included in the schedules of goods and services concessions of the 
individual Member State. All these issues are the subject of the WTO dispute 
settlement system. The frequency and number of disputes in which a Member 
State is in the role of respondent shows its good or bad reputation among the other 
WTO Member States.42  
On the whole, a nation would act on the basis of cost and advantage, but its 
calculation is hardly precise.43 This is also the case of China. As has been said, 
when China strived to join the WTO, China’s authorities had to do many trade-
offs during the accession process. Negotiations were led with 133 WTO members 
on the multilateral level and with 43 WTO Member States on the bilateral level. 
These countries had different economic interests and were on a different economic 
level, which also showed their priorities in negotiations. From the perspectives 
of those who participated in these negotiations, “China promised a great deal of 
market access, although it gained very little additional access from foreign trading 
partners in return.”44 However, China’s authorities have always considered issues 
in the long-term perspective. Thus, the short-term costs connected with China’s 
commitments in the WTO would be compensated by the long-term advantages. 
China’s WTO membership will eventually lead it to shaping the future of world 
trade. 
A critical question is then why countries do not comply with their 
commitments. It is due to either ambiguity in the treaty language, limitations 
in capacity to carry out their undertakings, or the magnitude of the social, 
economic and political changes required to comply.45 A comprehensive model of 
compliance also considers factors that affect the implementation, compliance and 
effectiveness of international accords. These factors can then be divided into two 
groups. One includes ‘country-specific’ factors determined by parameters (such 
as history and culture, physical size, physical variation, number of neighbours, 
etc.), fundamental factors (such as economy, political and institutional attitudes 
and values), and proximate factors (such as administrative capacity, leadership, 
non-governmental organizations, knowledge and information). The other is 
‘non-country specific’ factors including the characteristics of the field of interest 
(such as the number of actors, the role of multinational corporations in the given 
area, the effect of economic subsidies, etc.), the characteristics of the accord 
(reciprocity or unanimity in accepting obligations, provision for obtaining state 
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support, monitoring, incentives and sanctions, etc.) and the characteristics of the 
international environment (such as international non-governmental organizations, 
other international organizations, international financial institutions, worldwide 
media, international conferences or forums, etc.).46 However, all these factors 
should be analyzed dynamically, because they have changed during the time. 
B. China’s Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement 
The question how China fulfilled its IPRs commitments in the WTO includes two 
issues. The first is connected with the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement 
into China’s legislative, while the second is related to the effective enforcement of 
IP laws in China. In other words, how laws and implementing regulations that are 
enacted by the Chinese authorities in the area of IPRs are effectively used on the 
national as well as local level after China’s entrance into the WTO. 
After the accession of China to the WTO, the Chinese government gradually 
improved its IP administrative and regulatory system.47 The administration 
of IPRs is carried out the national and local level, through the State Council48 
and its administrative bodies,49 and the local administrative authorities. The 
state administrative authorities are responsible for examining and granting or 
registering IPRs, while the local authorities administer and enforce them at 
the local level. Although the division of competencies on the national and 
local level looks very clear, it should be kept in mind that China has 1.3 billion 
people who live in 23 provinces, 5 autonomous regions and 4 municipalities. 
These administrative bodies are further divided into lower levels. Besides the 
central government, there are four types of local governments, two types of 
provincial governments in municipalities and cities and rural area governments.50 
In the following, the term ‘local government’ is used to refer to the levels of 
government other than the central government. The role of local government in 
economic development is substantive. The Chinese government system is highly 
centralized in official appointments, while, at the same time, quite decentralized in 
economic development activities. The central government controls the power over 
regulation, resource allocation, quotas, and the approval of numerous activities 
on the central level. However, it relies on the cooperation of local governments 
in implementing and achieving the set of policy goals. Local governments might 
also pursue their own goals which are not necessarily in compliance with those 
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pursued at higher levels. Although there has been no real division of functions, 
a certain competition would exist between provincial/municipal governments.51 
Thus, China’s administrative structure could influence especially the effective 
enforcement of IP laws in China. Although the Chinese authorities have modified 
China’s IPR laws and regulations to facilitate China’s WTO commitments, an 
effective IPRs enforcement has not been yet achieved.52 China’s major trading 
partner identified the main problems as a lack of coordination among the main 
enforcement agencies, local protectionism and corruption.53 Actually, the more 
number of state offices is or the stronger the state influence is, the lower the 
economic effectiveness of a country is. Inefficient bureaucracy and corruption are 
currently among the five main problematic factors for doing business in China.54 
The centralised state power and the existence of State-Owned Enterprises in the 
main sectors of the Chinese economy are another specific factor in the creation 
of the Chinese model of compliance. The education of customs officers and 
other bureaucracy on every level is also connected with this issue. Although 
the administrative capacity in China is sufficient, a lack of sufficiently trained 
personnel is another problem in China.55
In order to improve the IP regulatory system, the Chinese authorities amended 
IP laws and regulations, as well as departmental rules. These revisions included 
especially the Patent Law, the Trademark Law, the Copyright Law, new 
regulations on the protection of computer software, new plant varieties, and layout 
designs of integrated circuits.56 In addition, the Chinese authorities enacted tens of 
other IP related laws, implementing rules or regulations after China entered into 
the WTO.57 In the area of patents, the key amendment in legislation involved a 
judicial review of design and utility models.58 Another change lay in the issue of 
parallel imports. Up until 2008, the legislative had not clarified whether parallel 
imports were allowed, but the revised Patent Law explicitly permitted them in 
the end.59 Other measures, which were introduced in the area of patent protection 
during the monitored period, included the granting of design patents for graphical 
user interface products, the improvement of the protection of biological materials 
through patents, the improvement measures for the patent agency system and the 
standardization procedures for patent protection enforcement across China. There 
were also changes in the following areas: (1) trademark protection related to the 
protection of sound marks and well-known trademarks; (2) the adoption of “a one-
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trademark-registered-for-multiple-class” system as a new way of application for 
registration as well as online electronic applications to facilitate registration; (3) 
the protection of well-known trademarks; (4) the introduction of the principle of 
good faith for the registration and use of trademarks; (5) the increase of penalties 
for trademark infringement; (6) the strengthening of the protection of exclusive 
trademark rights; and (7) the strengthening of responsibility for trademark 
infringement of the operator of an Internet trading platform.60 
Although the IPR laws have been gradually improved by the Chinese 
authorities after its joining the WTO, some issues have remained unsolved. For 
example, parallel imports in the case of copyright and trademarks have remained 
not covered by legislation until now. The Trademark Law provides more detailed 
guidelines for the identification of well-known trademarks, but it does not set 
time limits for the identification process.61 Another issue is the new multiple-
class trademark application system. A question may arise whether it is actually 
beneficial for trademark applicants.62 There is a serious uncertainty in relation to 
the compliance of China’s IP laws with the national and MFN rules. The TRIPS 
Agreement states:
Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less 
favourable than that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection 
of intellectual property, … and also With regard to the protection of intellectual 
property, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by a Member 
to the nationals of any other country shall be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the nationals of all other Members…63
Practice shows that the principle of non-discrimination, laid down in Articles 
3 and 4 of the TRIPS Agreement, has been violated during the registration of 
trademarks. In detail, all applicants are required to register their trademarks with 
the Trademark Office of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce 
(“SAIC”). However, foreigners and foreign companies not domiciled in China 
or without industrial or commercial establishments in China must register their 
trademarks through an agency qualified to act as an agent by the SAIC,64 which 
can be more costly and less safe for them. If registration with the State Trademark 
Office is a prerequisite for protection under the Trademark Law, then a different 
process for the registration of trademarks between Chinese and foreign companies 
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would raise serious concerns among foreign applicants. Although this issue has 
already been recorded by the WTO Secretariat earlier65 and the improvement of 
the patent agency system was the subject of the last amendments of the Patent 
Law in 2008, the registration of trademarks in bad faith has continued all the time. 
For example, the United State Trade Representatives (“USTR”) states that the US 
companies across industry sectors continue to face Chinese applicants registering 
their marks and holding them for ransom or seeking to establish a business 
building off the American company’s global reputation. These incidents have 
caused consumer confusion, commercial harm and costly legal proceedings.66 
Except for the registration of trademarks, the registration of layout-designs is 
another area in which foreign applicants (non-resident in China) have to register 
through a patent agency designated by the State Intellectual Property Office 
(“SIPO”).67 Some authors mention that a low transparency of accepted provisions 
and the effective enforcement of the IPRs law in China also remains unclear.68 
The enforcement of IPRs in China is carried out by a large number of 
responsible authorities, which enact administrative or judicial measures. 
Administrative actions consist of mediation by the authorities, while judicial 
actions, whether civil or criminal, are taken through the public security authorities, 
procuratorial organs and the courts. The administrative authority can impose fines 
on the infringing party or confiscate or destroy the infringing goods or copies, 
materials, tools or devices used mainly for the infringement. If mediation does not 
bring satisfactory results, the administrative authority may refer the case to the 
people’s court. The people’s courts can impose monetary fines based on either the 
value or volume of the counterfeited goods or both. Criminal prosecutions may be 
also taken in certain cases in accordance with the Criminal Law.69 Although the 
Chinese authorities have adequate instruments to fight against IPR infringement 
and all public security authorities above the prefecture and city levels cooperate 
to fight against IPRs crime activities, China’s main trading partner regarded an 
inadequate deterrence provided by the system of administrative, civil, and criminal 
penalties as one of the main problems.70 In order to intensify the enforcement of 
IPRs, the Chinese authorities revised the Patent Law in 2008, by which penalties 
including the patent owner’s expenditure in protecting patents and fines, as well as 
legal compensation, have increased. However, statistics confirm that, the number 
of patent disputes has increased during the past years in spite of higher financial 
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sanctions.71
The Customs, which check consignments at the border, are another important 
body in the enforcement of IPRs in China, which borders with 14 other countries. 
Although the TRIPS Agreement does not oblige China to apply border measures 
in cases of exporting counterfeit trademark or copyright goods, China has paid 
special attention to the IP protection of exports and cooperates in this area with 
the US, the EU and other WTO members in order to strengthen the enforcement 
of regulations on counterfeit and pirated exports. The Customs carry out their 
activities under the revised Regulations on Customs Protection of Intellectual 
Property, which entered into effect on April 1, 2010. However, trading partners 
still urge China to step up its efforts in enforcing IPRs protection, including a 
greater and more effective customs control and criminal prosecution.72 Responding 
to this requirement, customs offices in China have launched several special 
campaigns to crack down on IPR-infringing activities and the production and sale 
of counterfeit goods.
In order to improve the administrative enforcement, the Chinese authorities 
have launched a series of campaigns for public awareness of IPRs protection. 
Since 2006, the SIPO has been publishing annual Action Plans on IPRs protection 
and offering a Chinese-English bilingual IPRs protection government web portal.73 
In 2011, the Chinese authorities founded the National Leading Group on the Fight 
against IPRs Infringement and Counterfeiting chaired by the Vice Premier of the 
State Council.74 Despite these efforts, the infringement of IPRs is widespread.75 As 
of 2015, China was the largest IPRs infringer which shipped such goods as mobile 
phones and accessories, memory cards, computer equipment, CD/DVD and 
lighters, to the EU.76  China was again placed on the Priority Watch List in USTR’s 
2016 Special 301 report. In December 2016, moreover, the USTR announced the 
results of its “2016 Out-of-Cycle Review of Notorious Markets,” which included 
several Chinese markets. The US authorities point out especially an inefficient 
civil resources mechanism and a still insufficient commitment overall. They are 
demonstrated by resource constraints, lack of training, lack of initiative, lack of 
transparency in the enforcement process and its outcomes, procedural obstacles 
to civil enforcement, lack of coordination among Chinese government ministries 
and agencies, as well as local protectionism and corruption. On the whole, the 
US authorities state that after 15 years in the WTO, China would be still weak on 
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many IPRs rules.77 This statement is confirmed by the international comparison. 
China was in the 62nd among 138 countries in IP protection with a score of 4.3 
points, where the scale is in the range from 1 to 7 (7 is the best). Although the 
Chinese authorities improved its IPRs regulatory framework and amended its IPRs 
laws and regulations in order to comply with its commitments in the WTO and 
other international organizations or conventions, the enforcement of IPR continues 
would be still a major challenge for China. 
V. chIna’s IPrs ProtectIon under the Wto 
     dIsPute settlement mechanIsm
Although many WTO members doubt China’s compliance with the TRIPS 
Agreement and the fulfilment of its IPRs commitments in the WTO, there was only 
one case for China to be the subject of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism 
for its IPRs infringement. That is the China - Measures Affecting the Protection 
and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights case (DS362) between the US 
and China. Several other WTO members also requested to join the consultation as 
the third parties of this dispute.78  The WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) 
received a request for consultation from the US representatives on April 10, 2007. 
The dispute concerned measures affecting the protection and enforcement of IPRs, 
namely, Articles 9, 41, 46, 59 and 61 of the TRIPS Agreement.79 
The WTO panel found that Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement (border 
measures – remedies) was not disrupted and concluded that the factual evidence 
presented by the US was inadequate to show whether or not the cases excluded 
from criminal liability met the TRIPS standard of ‘commercial scale’ when that 
standard was applied to China's marketplace.80 The other two areas of dispute were 
found by the WTO’s panel to be inconsistent with the provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement. In the first case, the panel concluded that the way in which China's 
customs auctioned the goods was inconsistent with Article 59 of the TRIPS 
Agreement.81 In the second case, related to the TRIPS Agreement as well as the 
Berne Convention, the panel concluded that China's failure to protect copyright in 
prohibited works was inconsistent with Article 5(1) of the Berne Convention as 
incorporated in Article 9.1 of the TRIPS, so that the copyright in such prohibited 
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works could not be enforced.82 The DSB adopted a panel report at its meeting 
on March 20, 2009. In June 2009, China and the US informed the DSB that the 
reasonable period of time for China to implement the DSB recommendations 
and rulings would be 12 months from the adoption of the report.83 Although the 
Chinese representatives stated that China had completed all necessary domestic 
legislative procedures for implementing the DSB recommendations and rulings, in 
January 2017, the US representatives again claimed that China did not appeal the 
WTO panel rulings in favour of the US and subsequently modified the measures at 
issue.84 Article 22 of the DSU provides:
If the losing Member fails to bring its measure into conformity with its WTO 
obligations within a reasonable period of time, the prevailing complainant is 
entitled to resort to temporary measures, which can be either compensation or 
the suspension of WTO obligations (Art. 22.1). If no satisfactory compensation 
has been agreed within 20 days after the date of expiry of the reasonable period 
of time, any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures may request 
authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the Member concerned 
of concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements (Art. 22.2).
This case demonstrates that despite all the positives, which are connected with 
the TRIPS Agreement, it is extremely difficult to solve IPRs disputes through the 
WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism. Those difficulties are due to the following 
factors. First, it is difficult to collect a clear evidence of systematic non-compliance 
with the TRIPS Agreement. Actually, IPRs disputes are small part of the total 
trade disputes in the WTO. Second, the fulfilment of the WTO’s commitments as 
well as the DSB recommendations and rulings are demanding time with unsteady 
results. If some form of sanction is applied to China, it can cause retaliation and 
escalate tension among all sides of the dispute.
As mentioned above, China’s membership in the WTO does not mean that the 
commitments which China accepted during its accession process are automatically 
fulfilled. As has been said, on the one hand, China is often criticized for mal-
enforcement of IPRs. It is still weak after 15 years of its membership in the WTO. 
On the other hand, the WTO Secretariat and others appreciate China’s progress 
relating to IPRs. One of the main questions is why China should further improve 
the enforcement of IPRs laws. This question may have several answers. First, the 
Chinese authorities would finally realize the importance of IPRs protection for 
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further economic development of China.85 Second, non-compliance means to be a 
subject of the compensation and suspension of concessions. In addition, China’s 
widespread counterfeiting not only does harms the business interests of right-
holders, both foreign and domestic, but also includes many products that pose a 
direct threat to the health and safety of consumers,86 which influences China’s 
reputation in the world. 
In the past, China’s economic ‘miracle’ was based on the package of economic 
reforms following the open door policy. FDI exploded after 1992 and, within 
a few years, become the predominant source of technology inflows into China. 
Also, multinational corporations (“MNCs”) became key players transferring 
technology into China, for not only their attempts to access the domestic market, 
but also their speed including China into global production networks of high-
technology products. Chinese economic policymakers were increasingly willing 
to provide market access and promises of protection of IPRs to foreign MNCs if 
they were willing to transfer production to China.87 In other words, the relocation 
of the production from developed countries, such as the US, Japan, the UK, etc. 
to China was also followed by a transfer of technology. Thus, the producers from 
developed countries got additional gains from the lower production costs and 
the Chinese government got an easier access to new technological progresses. 
However, the current situation is different. Besides being in the third position of 
the top host economies with FDI inflows of USD 134 billion in 2016, China was 
also in the second position of top home economies with FDI outflows of USD 
183 billion in the same year.88 This means that while at the end of the 20th century 
China was the main destination for foreign direct investment inflows from the 
whole world, at the beginning of the twenty-first century China has also became 
one of the leading investors in the world. In 1994, China’s investment in research 
and development (“R&D”) was below 0.6 percent of GDP,89 but today’s gross 
domestic R&D spending is 2.05 percent of GDP which is higher than that of the 
UK and Canada.90 Although China has been a middle-income economy all the 
time, it holds the 22nd position among 127 economies in the Global Innovation 
Index in 2017. There, China has a better position than Australia, Belgium, Italy 
and some other higher-income countries.91 China has become more competitive in 
many economic sectors because of its own innovation and research.92 In the past, 
the protection of IPRs was essential for ensuring the continued inflows of FDI 
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and the associated transfer of newly developed technologies, as well as fostering 
the development of new technologies and services in China. Currently, however, 
the Chinese authorities realise that the strengthening of IPRs protection is also 
important for its domestic innovators and IP holders. On the whole, China’s 
compliance with the TRIPS Agreement has a positive influence on the foreign as 
well as domestic owners of IPR who want stable environment for doing business 
in China.
Table 1 shows a growing number of applicants for patents, trademarks and 
industrial design in China during 2001−15. While the highest number of filings was 
recorded in trademark, both in the beginning as well as at the end of the monitored 
period, the highest increase of filings was recorded in patents. Especially, patents 
applied by residents increased the most; it was more than 32-fold. The highest 
number of patent applications covered digital communication, electrical machinery, 
apparatus, energy, computer technology, and other fields of technology.93 A 
positive correlation between patent applications (residents as well as non-residents) 
and patent filings is also obvious. This indicates improving the system of IPRs 
management in China. However, the rights-holders in China frequently have their 
IP rights infringed. More concretely, about 1.3 percent of seizures of counterfeit 
and pirated goods concerns violations of the IP rights of Chinese companies.94 
It indicates a very strong threat of counterfeiting and piracy that undermines the 
innovative efforts of Chinese companies relying on knowledge-based capital and 
using IPRs in their business strategies. In addition, counterfeiting goods causes 
financial loss to both the Chinese government and the IPRs holders.95
Table 1: The Number of Patents, Trademarks and Industrial Designs in 2001-2015
96
2001 2005 2010 2015
Patent: 
- Applicants (Resident) 30,038 93,485 293,066 968,252
- Applicants 
(Non-resident)
33,412 79,842   98,111 133,612
- Filings 31,232 97,948 308,326     1,010,448
Trademark
- Filings 238,301 630,346     1,054,465   2,146,666*
Industrial Design
- Filings 56,748 155,236 421,418 589,571
* Data available until 2014. 
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The TRIPS Agreement has been implemented in China from both micro and 
macro-economic point of view.  This brings gains for business (companies) 
and the economic growth for the whole country. In other words, the effective 
enforcement of IPRs in China brings a higher confidence for domestic as well 
as foreign investors and patent-holders, which are the source of new productions 
and jobs in China. Then, the economic growth creates the optimal assumptions 
for achieving political goals and stability in the country. In the 13th Five-Year 
Plan, which was approved in October 2015, Chinese policymakers considered 
innovations as the main driver of economic growth. 97 In order to enhance China’s 
capability of protecting IP, in June 2008, the State Council issued the Outline of 
the National Intellectual Property Strategy. The Outline identifies the strategic 
goal of China becoming, by 2020, a country with a comparatively high level in 
terms of the creation, utilization, protection and administration of IPRs. In January 
2015, the State Council issued an action plan on the further implementation of 
IPRs strategy, highlighting the goals and measures for IPRs from 2014 to 2020.98
The compliance of China with the TRIPS Agreement is also connected with 
China’s reputation among the other 163 WTO members as well as their bilateral 
trade partners. China is currently the leading producer of manufacturing goods 
in the world, so that it needs to cooperate (export as well as import) with other 
countries around the world. In general, the protection of IPRs produces more 
stability and transparency in business. On the other hand, however, the experience 
of some producers and exporters shows that counterfeiting and piracy have 
become a ‘motor’ of innovation-driven economies. They count on the possibility 
of the copy of their products in advance, so that they innovate their production all 
the time. In general, to be more competitive in the world market, it is necessary for 
producers to jump one step further.
VI. conclusIon and recommendatIons
This article has shown that although the protection of IPRs in China has become 
one of the urgent priorities of the Chinese government in recent, China is still the 
largest producing economy of counterfeit goods in the world.99 How effectively 
did China absorb the TRIPS obligations into its legal system after joining the 
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WTO? Actually, China enacted domestic IP laws in accordance with the TRIPS 
Agreement and amended the Patent Law, the Copyright Law, the Trademark 
Law and IP regulations. However, some issues have remained unsolved until 
now, which has influenced on the investment and business in China for both 
residents and non-residents. Today, the effective enforcement of IPRs in China is 
the point at issue. It is based on the subjective assessments of other stakeholders 
with respect to the WTO agreements and rules, which are focused more on the 
implementation of IPRs commitments than their enforcement.
The WTO can positively make contribution to enforcing IP laws (or 
compliance with the TRIPS Agreement), especially through the Council for 
TRIPS and the Dispute Settlement Body. However, the effective solution of IPRs 
disputes in the WTO has not been wholly confirmed in this article. In addition, 
while assessing China’s compliance, it is necessary to remember that the TRIPS 
Agreement establishes minimum standards and the ‘flexibility’ offered to all WTO 
members in interpreting various articles of the agreement makes the assessment of 
compliance more problematic. Eventually, the assessment of China’s compliance 
with the TRIPS Agreement should include both the intention and willingness of 
the Chinese policymakers to comply, and the capacity to do it. This is influenced 
by not only country specific factors (e.g., geographical feature, historical 
background, political and economic system, technological level), but also non-
country specific factors (e.g., further negotiations in the WTO, the improvement 
of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, and the role of MNCs in China). 
China’s willingness and intention to improve IPRs protection were documented 
after 2001. However, in addition to enacting new laws and regulations and 
formulating development plans and strategies, a wider cooperation with other 
WTO members and international organizations should be necessary. In this sense, 
China’s policymakers are recommended to utilize the activity of the MNCs in a 
common endeavour to fight against counterfeiting and piracy in China. Thus, for 
the capacity to comply with the TRIPS commitments, they should consider not 
only the amount of efforts for the protection of IPRs, but the effectiveness and the 
quality of human sources.
IPR protection is indispensable for foreign investors as well as IPRs holders 
to do business in China. However, China also needs an effective system of IPRs 
for several reasons. First, foreign investors and their new technologies have 
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played an important role in developing China’s industry all the time. Second, the 
Chinese government supports its own innovators and creators. From this point 
of view, China’s government also has an interest to protect China’s research and 
innovation. Third, counterfeit and piracy cause tax and customs losses. Lastly, 
these will damage China’s reputation in the global society.
China has recorded positive progress in the area of IPRs during the last 15 
years, but shortcomings still remain in the enforcement of IPRs laws in China, 
especially on the local level. However, the higher the economic level of a country 
is, the higher the necessity and stress on the protection of IPR is put. Two and a 
half centuries ago, fast-growing nations, such as the US and other western powers, 
whose capitalism as we know it today was still very much in its infancy, were 
a hotbed of literary piracy. In comparison with the US and western countries, 
up until the early nineteenth century, China retained its pre-eminent position in 
the world economy. It was the major producer of steel, the leader in technical 
innovations in textile manufacturing in the world, the source of new innovations 
in the production of paper, book printing and the leading trade nation. At this 
time, British and European manufactures followed China’s lead, assimilating 
and borrowing its more advanced technology, and were eager to gain entrance to 
China’s advanced and lucrative market. In a similar way, 40 years ago, Japan was 
one of the biggest patent infringers, but, in the 1990s, it changed into an exporter 
of new ideas and now becomes the third biggest patent filler in the world.100 
These more or less distant historical events show that the protection of intellectual 
property is related to a country’s economic development. China is similar the 
US, Japan and Britain of the past.101 Accepting the TRIPS Agreement China can 
demonstrate its desire to be an innovator, not a copier.
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